

THE FAILURE OF SUCCESS: HOW THE BATHSHEBA SYNDROME AND
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE CONTRIBUTE TO THE DOWNFALL
OF ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL-LEVEL LEADERS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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2014-01

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 13-06-2014		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2013 – JUN 2014	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Failure of Success: How the Bathsheba Syndrome and Emotional Intelligence Contribute to the Downfall of Army Organizational-Level Leaders				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Matthew R. Minear, U.S. Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT In the last decade of military conflict, the United States Army has dealt with an epidemic of organizational-level leaders committing moral and ethical violations. Many of these leaders were commissioned officers serving at the highest ranks of the military. They did not display any previous indications of this behavior and the military classified their service as exemplary. This thesis examined four case studies to determine if there was a possibility that the success of these leaders, the Emotional Intelligence that each of them seemed to possess, and the factors of the Bathsheba Syndrome contributed to their downfall. The failures of these leaders ranged from adulterous behavior in the case of General David H. Petraeus and General Kevin P. Byrnes, to abuse of government funds and privileges by General William E. 'Kip' Ward, to finally the fostering of inappropriate command climates and abuse of subordinates with Lieutenant General Patrick J. O'Reilly. The four case studies demonstrated that each of these leaders was susceptible or displayed the conditions of the Bathsheba Syndrome and that the Emotional Intelligence that each of them possessed was a factor in their failures.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS United States Army, Bathsheba Syndrome, Emotional Intelligence, Organizational-Level Leaders					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			(U)	85	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE FAILURE OF SUCCESS: HOW THE BATHSHEBA SYNDROME AND EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE CONTRIBUTE TO THE DOWNFALL OF ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL-LEVEL LEADERS, by Major Matthew R. Minear, 85 pages.

In the last decade of military conflict, the United States Army has dealt with an epidemic of organizational-level leaders committing moral and ethical violations. Many of these leaders were commissioned officers serving at the highest ranks of the military. They did not display any previous indications of this behavior and the military classified their service as exemplary. This thesis examined four case studies to determine if there was a possibility that the success of these leaders, the Emotional Intelligence that each of them seemed to possess, and the factors of the Bathsheba Syndrome contributed to their downfall. The failures of these leaders ranged from adulterous behavior in the case of General David H. Petraeus and General Kevin P. Byrnes, to abuse of government funds and privileges by General William E. 'Kip' Ward, to finally the fostering of inappropriate command climates and abuse of subordinates with Lieutenant General Patrick J. O'Reilly. The four case studies demonstrated that each of these leaders was susceptible or displayed the conditions of the Bathsheba Syndrome and that the Emotional Intelligence that each of them possessed was a factor in their failures.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to thank all those people who contributed to the completion of my thesis. I would like to start by thanking my thesis committee. Dr. Bradbeer, I truly appreciate all of the time that you invested in me throughout this process. I know that it was not easy dealing with me and that you could have used the phrase “you’re wrong” a lot throughout this project. LTC Joslin and Mr. Sewell you always gave me a new perspective and asked those questions that pushed me just that much further in my thoughts. You do not know how beneficial that was and how much it helped me.

I would like to thank Dr. Rhonda Risner, my thesis seminar leader, and the members of my seminar who put up with my questions and shared insight into their own research, which helped me through my own.

I would like to thank the members and instructors of my small group, 10C. All of you made this year seem a little less hectic, a little less difficult, and a lot more fun. I hope that we get the chance to serve together again in the near future.

I would like to thank the staff of the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth. I truly am grateful for the help with the research and your patience in putting up with me during the long hours that I spent in the library.

Finally, I want to thank my wife Kristina, my son Connor, and my daughters Abigail and Ava Reese for allowing me the time to work on this project, the support that you gave me, and the motivation to see this thesis through to the end. Without your love, there is no way I would have completed this thesis, nor would I be where I am in my career or life. I love you.

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ACRONYMS

AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
IG	Inspector General
LRM	Army Leadership Requirements Model
MDA	Missile Defense Agency
MSAF 360	Multi-Source Assessment Feedback 360 Degree
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
USACGSC	United States Army Command and General Staff College

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

Over the past decade of military conflict, there are numerous examples of how organizational-level United States Army leaders have failed. Many factors contributed to these failures. The author proposes that many of these failures are the result of leaders that were not prepared for the success of their careers. Specifically, these leaders exhibited the Bathsheba Syndrome, and they did not possess proper Emotional Intelligence to deal with their success.

In 1993, Ludwig and Longenecker outlined the Bathsheba Syndrome in *The Journal of Business Ethics*. The historical basis for this syndrome comes from the biblical story of King David and his affair with Bathsheba. The premise of the syndrome is that when leaders rise to a certain level of success, they fail due to four factors. First, the success of the leader causes them to become complacent and lose focus on the primary job or duty. Second, success provides these leaders with privileged access to things, such as people or information. Third, a product of the leader's success is unrestrained control of organizational resources. Finally, because of this success these leaders feel that they are able to manipulate the outcomes of situations.¹ The result of these factors is that leaders or managers that have not displayed previous unethical behavior act in a way that jeopardizes their careers.

¹Dean C. Ludwig and Clinton O. Longenecker, "The Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical Failure of Successful Leaders," *Journal of Business Ethics* 12, no. 4 (April 1993): 265.

Research Questions

Primary Research Question

To what degree did the success of Army organizational leaders and their lack of Emotional Intelligence contribute to their failures?

Secondary Research Questions

In what ways should the Army incorporate Emotional Intelligence into leader development programs to educate and train leaders to deal with the Bathsheba Syndrome and the impacts of success?

What factors of Emotional Intelligence are the most important for an organizational level leader to possess and how can the Army identify leaders with these attributes?

Assumptions

In order to illustrate the incidents that demonstrate the failures of Army organizational level leaders, the author will use four vignettes. The author assumes that these vignettes will provide enough evidence of the Bathsheba Syndrome and the leaders' lack of Emotional Intelligence.

The author also makes the assumption that if one of the case study subjects demonstrates attributes of Emotional Intelligence in interviews or articles that came after the time of the incident or prior to the incident that this is an indication of their overall Emotional Intelligence. Although the human experience is about learning and growing there is not enough in depth research for the author to determine the level of growth or regression of the case study subjects from one date to another. The level of Emotional

Intelligence that the author determines for use in the overall assessment is based on the sum of the research about each case study subject.

Definition of Terms

The key terms that require definition include Emotional Intelligence, education, and training. The author will present current research that outlines the principles of Emotional Intelligence. The author will not attempt to develop a new definition for Emotional Intelligence but will leverage the research conducted to date by experts in the field. The author will define education and training. The application of these two terms is critical to understanding how the Army can develop or adjust programs for leader development. For the purposes of this thesis, the terms vignette and case study are interchangeable.

Limitations

There is a limitation to the relevance of the vignettes. Since these incidents occurred in the recent past, there are not always significant sources of information that detail all aspects of the leadership failures. Specifically, the availability of current and concise biographies, autobiographies, or other relevant sources is not on hand. In addition, the nature of the failures of these leaders is not conducive to in-depth analysis from their own perspective due to the fact of the negative nature of their offenses.

The selection of only flag officers is also a limitation for the research. The availability of detailed information on field and company grade officers prevented the author from selecting current and relevant vignettes from these two groups of officers. There are examples of field grade and company grade officers from the past but very few

examples exist for analysis within the last decade of military operations with enough detail or perspective to develop sound conclusions.

The choice to analyze only Army officers, as opposed to other branches of service, is also a limitation for this research. There are numerous examples of officers and leaders succumbing to moral and ethical failures from all branches of military service, federal agencies, and private sector institutions. The amount of examples and the requirement to research the leadership training and specific aspects of each branch of service, agency, or institution would exceed the scope of the research and time given for the author.

Scope and Delimitations

This study will not attempt to redefine Emotional Intelligence or the Bathsheba Syndrome. The author will use a determined definition for Emotional Intelligence while still taking into account the relevant research already conducted in the field. The research will not cover aspects of the studied leaders beyond what is available concerning their leadership failures. For example, the author will not research childhood issues that may have influenced the unethical behavior of the leaders. The author will not attempt to determine if there were previous incidents of unethical behavior in the officers' pasts beyond that which the vignettes reveal.

Significance of the Study

This study will help to identify leader development recommendations for future training and education for organizational level leaders. The study may help to identify leaders that lack Emotional Intelligence and the ability to command effectively. The

study could lead to new techniques to develop leaders in ways to deal with success not just the prevention of failure. The study may contribute to the further advancement and refinement of the Army leadership development process or help to illustrate further areas of study for inclusion into Officer Professional Military Education.

The author hopes that this research will help future United States Army officers and officers from other branches of service avoid the same mistakes as the officers presented in this thesis, and other officers who have unfortunately ruined their lives and careers with similar actions. This research is not an attempt to slander or defame any of the people included, but instead hopes to serve as an example by which others can learn. In the end the most important thing that the author hopes for is the betterment of the profession of arms and an acknowledgement that the ethical and moral failures of leaders requires the attention of everyone involved in the uniformed services.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to determine if there is a correlation between the levels of Emotional Intelligence that Army organizational leaders possess and the conditions of the Bathsheba Syndrome. Specifically, this research looks at whether there are variables, which in conjunction with success, lead to failures. The author suggests that leaders are not prepared to deal with their success and display the characteristics of the Bathsheba Syndrome. In drawing this correlation, the author hopes to suggest improvements to the Army leader development process, which will help leaders to counter the possibility of encountering the Bathsheba Syndrome. This research could help to identify Emotional Intelligence attributes and/or competencies that the Army wishes to develop in junior officers and serve as a tool for the selection of future commanders.

Chapter Organization

This chapter is organized into four categories. The first category of literature deals with the theory of Emotional Intelligence. The reader requires this literature in order to understand the basis of Emotional Intelligence and the various theories that exist. Although there is an enormous amount of literature that deals with this topic, the author will not attempt to provide all theories. Instead, a summation of the most relevant research in the field is provided. The second category of literature deals with the origins of the Bathsheba Syndrome. The reader requires this literature in order to understand how Emotional Intelligence and the Bathsheba Syndrome apply to Army organizational leader

failures. The third category of literature deals with various vignettes illustrating how successful Army leaders, fell prey to the Bathsheba Syndrome. This category includes the biographies of the case study subjects. The final category of literature outlines current Army leadership doctrine and the Army's education program. Readers require this information so that the author can highlight possible changes to the system that take into account Emotional Intelligence factors.

Emotional Intelligence

The theory of Emotional Intelligence is not new. The modern concept of Emotional Intelligence started as early as the 1920s. However, it was not until 1990 that John Mayer and Peter Salovey coined the term Emotional Intelligence. Their definition of Emotional Intelligence, originally a subset of social intelligence, was "the ability to monitor one's own and other's feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one's thinking."²

Daniel Goleman, perhaps the most recognized proponent of Emotional Intelligence today, furthered the initial research of Mayer and Salovey in his book, *Emotional Intelligence, Why It Can Matter More Than IQ* in 1995. The foundation of the research is that the factors of Emotional Intelligence are just as important, if not more so, than the factors of intelligence.³

²Peter Salovey and John D. Mayer, "Emotional Intelligence," *Imagination, Cognition, and Personality* 9 (1990): 185-211, [http://www.unh.edu/emotional_intelligence/EIAssets/Emotional Intelligence Proper/EI1990%20Emotional%20Intelligence.pdf](http://www.unh.edu/emotional_intelligence/EIAssets/Emotional%20Intelligence%20Proper/EI1990%20Emotional%20Intelligence.pdf) (accessed 19 December 2013).

³Daniel Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence*, 10th ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 2005), v.

Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee reframed Emotional Intelligence into four domains and two associated competencies in their book *Primal Leadership*. The four domains are self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, and relationship management.⁴ Self-awareness and self-management fall into the social competency category. Both of these domains are about the emotions within a person. Self-awareness refers to an understanding of one's own emotions, strengths, limitations, and understanding your values and motives.⁵ Self-management is the ability of a person to control his or her own emotions; in other words, it is the ability to control one's own state of mind.⁶ The third and fourth domains, social awareness and relationship management, fall into the social competency category. They deal with the social aspects of emotion. Social awareness is another name for empathy, or the ability to understand what others are feeling.⁷ Relationship management includes persuasion, conflict management, and collaboration, is the way in which a person handles the emotions of other people.⁸

In *The Emotionally Intelligent Manager*, Caruso and Salovey illustrate their concept of Emotional Intelligence through four skills. The first skill identifies emotions and involves awareness of one's own emotions, the emotions of others, and the way those emotions are expressed or communicated. The second skill involves using one's emotion,

⁴Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, and Annie McKee, *Primal Leadership: Realizing the Power of Emotional Intelligence* (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2002), 38-39.

⁵Ibid., 40.

⁶Ibid., 46-47.

⁷Ibid., 48-49.

⁸Ibid., 51.

and how one allows emotions to influence thinking by matching emotions to tasks. The third skill deals with understanding emotions, or finding out what one's emotions mean; this is similar to conduct in a what-if analysis of one's emotions. The fourth, and final, skill is managing one's emotions. This skill requires integration of emotions into thinking.⁹

Dr. Reuven Bar-On, another expert in the field of Emotional Intelligence, developed the concept of Emotional Quotient in 1985. His research attempts to answer questions such as why do people possess greater levels of Emotional Intelligence? Why do those who have a greater Intelligence Quotient but lower Emotional Quotient not succeed? How can we measure Emotional Intelligence? Bar-On's research led to the development of an Emotional Quotient Inventory, which consisted of various realms and scales to measure Emotional Intelligence.¹⁰ Bar-On's model provides a consistent means to measure Emotional Intelligence.

The author uses Goleman's definition of Emotional Intelligence throughout the course of this paper. Specifically, the author applies the domains and competencies outlined in *Primal Leadership* to the case studies. The entirety of the domains and competences are below:

⁹David R. Caruso and Peter Salovey, *The Emotionally Intelligent Manager: How to Develop and Use the Four Key Emotional Skills of Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), x-xi.

¹⁰Steven J. Stein and Howard E. Book, *The Eq Edge: Emotional Intelligence and Your Success*, 3rd ed. (Mississauga, Ontario: Jossey-Bass, 2011), 2.

Emotional Intelligence Domains and Associated Competencies

Personal Competence: These capabilities determine how we manage ourselves

Self-Awareness

- Emotional Self-Awareness: Reading one's own emotions and recognizing their impact: using "gut sense" to guide decisions
- Accurate Self-Assessment: Knowing one's strengths and limits
- Self-Confidence: A sound sense of one's self-worth and capabilities

Self-Management

- Emotional Self-Control: Keeping disruptive emotions and impulses under control
- Transparency: Displaying honesty and integrity; trustworthiness
- Adaptability: Flexibility in adapting to changing situations or overcoming obstacles
- Achievement: The drive to improve performance to meet inner standards of excellence
- Initiative: Readiness to act and seize opportunities
- Optimism: Seeing the upside of events

Social Competence: These capabilities determine how we manage relationships.

Social Awareness

- Empathy: Sensing other's emotions, understanding their perspective, and taking active interest in their concerns
- Organizational Awareness: Reading the currents, decision networks, and politics at the organizational level
- Service: Recognizing and meeting follower, client, or customer needs

Relationship Management

- Inspirational Leadership: Guiding and motivating with a compelling vision
- Influence: Wielding a range of tactics for persuasion
- Developing Others: Bolstering other's abilities through feedback and guidance
- Change Catalyst: Initiating, managing, and leading in a new direction
- Conflict Management: Resolving disagreements
- Building Bonds: Cultivating and maintaining a web of relationships
- Teamwork and Collaboration: Cooperation and team building¹¹

¹¹Goleman et al., 39. Appendix B provides detail about the individual domains.

The Bathsheba Syndrome

Dean C. Ludwig and Clinton O. Longenecker first proposed the Bathsheba Syndrome in 1993. The story of King David in the *Bible* is familiar to many people. The basis of the story is that King David was very successful, rising to a position of power and influence and never displaying any tendencies of unethical or questionable behavior. However, because of the temptation of a beautiful woman, Bathsheba, he threw that all away. Bathsheba was married to one of King David's military officers, Uriah. Despite this fact, he still slept with her and she became pregnant. In an attempt to cover up his transgressions, David called Uriah back from the battlefield to sleep with his wife. Uriah refused to sleep with his wife because he knew his soldiers were not able to be with their loved ones. David then tried to get Uriah intoxicated so he would sleep with his wife. Uriah also refused to do this. David felt he had to take measures that were even more desperate. David gave his military commander, Joab, a secret order to have Uriah placed at the point of the fiercest fighting. Joab would then withdraw his men so that Uriah would die. During the battle, Uriah died and David took Bathsheba as his wife. If not for the prophet Nathan uncovering his actions, King David may have gone undiscovered.

The story of King David highlighted four areas that the authors of the article felt led to David's downfall. The first was that as a leader is more successful a degree of complacency and loss of focus occurs. The second area is that a leader's success allows them to have privileged access to information, people, or objects. Third, with greater success, leaders gain more or complete control of organizational resources. Fourth, with success leaders perceive or gain the ability to manipulate the outcomes of situations.¹²

¹²Ludwig and Longenecker, 165.

The following figure graphically depicts the four areas that successful leaders may encounter.¹³

Personal Level	Privileged Access Position Influence Status Rewards/Perks Recognition Latitude Associations Access	Inflated Belief in Personal Ability Emotionally Expansive Unablanced Personal Life Inflated Ego Isolation Stress Transference Emptiness Fear of Failure
	Control of Resources No Direct Supervision Ability to Influence Ability to set Agenda Control Over Decision Making	Loss of Strategic Focus Org on Autopilot Delegation without Supervision Strategic Complacency Neglect of Strategy
Organizational Level		

Figure 1. Possible Outcomes Experienced by Successful Leaders

Source: Dean C. Ludwig and Clinton O. Longenecker, "The Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical Failure of Successful Leaders," *Journal of Business Ethics* 12, no. 4 (April 1993): 265.

¹³Ludwig and Longenecker, 270.

Army Organizational-Level Leader Vignettes

In order to illustrate the idea of how Emotional Intelligence and the Bathsheba Syndrome relate the author will use four vignettes.¹⁴ These vignettes involve General David Petraeus, General William Ward, General Kevin P. Byrnes, and Lieutenant General Patrick J. O'Reilly. The inclusion of the biographies, specifically education and military background, is to ensure that the analysis addresses any similarities between the individuals.

General David H. Petraeus

In his article, "The Rise and Fall of 'General Peaches'," Mark Thompson describes the success of General David Petraeus and his subsequent fall from grace. This article gives the reader an understanding of the conflict between the ways various people perceived General Petraeus. There is the admiration from fellow general officers like Jack Keane, Barry McCaffrey, and Peter Chiarelli. This admiration includes words of praise like, "Great soldier, statesmen, and patriot," "He is one of the most talented and dedicated officers we have produced since World War II."¹⁵ However, there is also the criticisms, such as, "Petraeus is a remarkable piece of fiction created and promoted by

¹⁴The author analyzed numerous sources for all four vignettes. However, the author did not cite all references within the body of the thesis. For a comprehensive list of references, the reader should refer to the bibliography for further research material in reference to each of the case study/vignette subjects.

¹⁵Mark Thompson, "The Rise and Fall of 'General Peaches'," *Time*, 14 November 2012, <http://nation.time.com/2012/11/14/the-rise-and-fall-of-general-peaches/> (accessed 17 March 2014), 1.

neocons in government, the media, and academia.”¹⁶ This article is a great starting point to look at the man and the legacy of General Petraeus.

General David Petraeus is a native of Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York and graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1974.¹⁷ Upon graduation, General Petraeus received a commission as an infantryman and embarked on a distinguished career in the United States Army. He held various positions and leadership roles in airborne, mechanized, and air assault infantry units throughout the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. Some of his most notable non-command positions included, Aide to the Chief of Staff of the Army, Military Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, Chief of Operations of the United Nations Forces in Haiti, and Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁸

General Petraeus’ educational background is extensive. He graduated from the United States Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) in 1983 as the top graduate. He earned his Masters of Public Administration and Doctoral degree from Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Relations in 1985 and

¹⁶Thompson, 1.

¹⁷Infoplease, “David H. Petraeus,” Pearson Education, <http://www.infoplease.com/biography/var/davidpetraeus.html> (accessed 2 January 2014).

¹⁸U.S. Department of Defense, “General David H. Petraeus-Commander of International Security Assistance Force,” <http://www.defense.gov/bios/biography/detail.aspx?biographyid=166> (accessed 2 January 2014).

1987, respectively.¹⁹ He also served as a professor of international relations at West Point.²⁰

General Petraeus' contributions to the Global War on Terror were significant. He gained public acclaim as the commander of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) during Operation Iraqi Freedom where he led the division through Baghdad and into Mosul, Iraq. After commanding the 101st, he took over as the first commander for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Iraq. In this capacity, he carried the overall responsibility for training Iraqi security forces. Next, he served as the commander of the Combined Arms Center in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In this role, he was in charge of overseeing the development of the doctrine for the entire Army, as well as the education of the Army's field grade officer corps. After departing Fort Leavenworth, he served for 20 months as the Commander for United States Central Command. Finally, he assumed command of NATO ISAF and USFOR-A on 4 July 2010.²¹

After completing his assignment as the International Security and Assistance Forces and United States Forces Afghanistan Commander, General Petraeus retired from the military in 2011. Soon after, he received nomination for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, assuming that position on 6 September 2011.²² General Petraeus

¹⁹Infoplease, "David H. Petraeus."

²⁰U.S. Department of Defense, "General David H. Petraeus."

²¹Ibid.

²²Alanne Orjoux, Dana Ford, Phil Gast, Michael Pearson, and Carol Cratty, "Timeline of the Petraeus Affair," CNN Politics, last modified 15 November 2012, <http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/12/politics/petraeus-timeline/> (accessed 14 March 2014).

executed his duties as the Central Intelligence Agency director without any issues for approximately a year. However, in November 2012, he resigned from this position after an Federal Bureau of Investigation probe of emails sent by his biographer, Paula Broadwell, uncovered his extramarital affair with her.²³ Why did a man with such success, and what appeared to be a strong moral compass, take part in an adulterous relationship?

General William E. Ward

In an *Associated Press* article from October 2012, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey reportedly encouraged the Secretary of Defense to allow General Ward to retire at the rank of four-star general after allegations that Ward engaged in misconduct concerning official and unofficial travel.²⁴ These allegations included the unauthorized use of military vehicles and excessive spending by the first commander of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).

General William “Kip” Ward earned a commission as a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army as an infantryman in June 1971. He received his undergraduate degree from Morgan State University and his Master’s Degree from Pennsylvania State

²³Sari Horowitz and Greg Miller, “FBI Probe of Petraeus Triggered by E-Mail Threats from Biographer, Officials Say,” *Washington Post*, 10 November 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-probe-of-petraeus-triggered-by-e-mail-threats-from-biographer-officials-say/2012/11/10/d2fc52de-2b68-11e2-bab2-eda299503684_story_2.html (accessed 7 April 2014).

²⁴Associated Press, “Top Military Officer Opposes Demotion of Former Africa Command General Accused of Misconduct,” Fox News, 4 October 2012, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/10/04/top-military-officer-opposes-demotion-former-africa-command-general-accused/#content> (accessed 17 March 2014), 1.

University, both in political science. His military education includes graduation from the Infantry Officer's Basic Course, the USACGSC, and the Army War College.

General Ward served in numerous positions across the world throughout his career, including assignments in Korea, Egypt, Somalia, Bosnia, Germany, and various locations within the United States. His staff positions included Vice Director of Operations on the Joint Staff, Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation for Egypt, and Executive Officer for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. His command positions included Brigade Commander in the 10th Mountain Division, Commander of the 25th Infantry Division, Deputy Commander of the United States European Command Headquarters, and his final command as First Commander for AFRICOM.²⁵

General Ward assumed leadership as AFRICOM's first commander on 1 October 2007.²⁶ AFRICOM is one the military's most diverse commands. AFRICOM is one of the six geographic combatant commands. As the AFRICOM Commander, General Ward was responsible directly to the Secretary of Defense for the relationship with all African Nations, the African Union, and African regional security organizations. His responsibilities included the oversight of over 2,000 personnel. These personnel work in dispersed locations to include at the AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, in the United States, England, and in the Office of Security Cooperation and Defense

²⁵U.S. Department of Defense, "General William E. ("Kip") Ward—Commander, United States Africa Command," <http://www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=181> (accessed 4 January 2014). This webpage provides all of General Ward's biographical data.

²⁶*Ibid.*

Attaché Offices in 38 nations.²⁷ General Ward's assignment as the first commander of AFRICOM clearly demonstrated his abilities and potential for continued contributions to the military.

The Secretary of Defense at that time, Leon Panetta, demoted Ward to the rank of Lieutenant General after a prolonged Department of Defense Inspector General's (IG) investigation into allegations of lavish and unauthorized spending in the thousands of dollars.²⁸ The IG report, dated 26 June 2012, stated among other allegations, that he wasted government resources, abused his position by permitting his staff to perform personal services for him and his wife, and accepted prohibited gifts from an unauthorized source.²⁹ Why would an officer with such a successful career engage in activities that he knew, or should have known, were wrong?

General Kevin P. Byrnes

In August of 2005, General Byrnes, then the Commander of the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), was relieved for an adulterous affair with a civilian employee. General Byrnes' relief came only a few months before he was

²⁷U.S. Africa Command, "United States Africa Command," <http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command> (accessed 17 March 2014).

²⁸Associated Press. "General William "Kip" Ward demoted for lavish travel and spending," ABC News, 14 November 2012, <http://www.abccactionnews.com/dpp/news/national/general-william-kip-ward-demoted-for-lavish-travel-and-spending> (accessed 7 April 2014).

²⁹Office of the Inspector General, *Report of Investigation, General William E. Ward, U.S. Army Commander, U.S. AFRICOM*, 26 June 2012, Case number 11-119226-153, U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.dodig.mil/foia/ERR/WardROI_Redacted.pdf (accessed 4 January 2014), 1-2. This redacted report provides the specific information about the allegations.

scheduled to retire from the military with an otherwise untarnished record.³⁰ General Byrnes was a veteran of operations in Vietnam and once commanded the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood.

General Kevin P. Byrnes, a native of New York, earned a commission as a field artillery Second Lieutenant through Officer Candidate School in 1969. Following the Advanced Officers Course, he received his undergraduate degree in economics from Park College. He received Masters of Arts from Webster University, while attending USACGSC. He also graduated from the United States Army War College.³¹

General Byrnes was a successful officer, serving in various leadership roles throughout his Army career. He served in the Vietnam War as a forward observer. Following Vietnam, he completed staff assignments in Germany, Bosnia, and the United States, including Team Chief for the Inspector General Headquarters United States Army Europe, Director of Political and Economic Studies for the United States Army War College, and Director of the Strategic Outreach Initiative, also for the Army War College. His command positions included Commander of 1st Cavalry Division Artillery, Commander of Joint Task Force Six, and Commanding General of 1st Cavalry Division.³² General Byrnes final command position was as the Commander of United States Army TRADOC, which he assumed in November 2002. General Byrnes was

³⁰David S. Cloud, "Adultery Inquiry Costs General His Command," *New York Times*, 11 August 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/11/politics/11general.html?_r=0 (accessed 7 April 2014).

³¹North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Major General Kevin P. Byrnes Commander Multinational Division North," SFOR Informer, 2 December 2005, <http://www.nato.int/sfor/coms-sfor/byrnes.htm> (accessed 7 April 2014).

³²*Ibid.*

relieved from command in August 2005, by then-Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, following allegations of personal misconduct.³³ The IG report concerning General Byrnes' misconduct outlined the allegations against him. The IG determined that he participated in an adulterous relationship with a married female (known as Ms. A), he disobeyed a direct order to cease contact with this woman, and that he engaged in behavior that was deemed as conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman.³⁴ Why would an officer that ascended to the highest ranks of the Army take part in an affair that he knew was wrong?

Lieutenant General Patrick J. O'Reilly

A July 2012 *Washington Post* article portrayed the command climate and working environment at the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), directed by Lieutenant General O'Reilly, as unsatisfactory. In March of 2011, the MDA ranked 223 out of 224 in a survey of "Best Places to Work" by the Partnership for Public Service review of smaller federal operations. Reports from some MDA employees stated that O'Reilly, "yelled and screamed at subordinates in both public and private settings," and, "demeaned and belittled employees and, at least in one incident, demanded that a subordinate use profane

³³Eric Schmitt, 4-Star General Is Dismissed Over Conduct, *New York Times*, 10 August 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/10/politics/10general.html> (accessed 7 April 2014).

³⁴Office of the Inspector General, *Report of Investigation, Alleged Misconduct, General Kevin P. Byrnes, U.S. Army Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command*, 29 July 2005, Case number H05L94908011, U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.dodig.mil/FOIA/ERR/H05L94908011.pdf> (accessed 4 January 2014), 2.

language to admit to an alleged error.”³⁵ It appears that Lieutenant General O’Reilly showed no indications of this type of behavior prior to his position as the MDA director.

Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly earned a commission as a maintenance officer from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1978. He served later in his career as an Ordnance officer and physics instructor at West Point, after which time he transferred to the Army Acquisition Corps.³⁶ Lieutenant General O’Reilly received a master’s degree in physics from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is also a graduate of USACGSC, Naval College of Command and Staff, and the Army War College.³⁷

Lieutenant General O’Reilly was a very successful officer, serving in various staff and leadership roles at various units to include the 1st Cavalry Division, 3rd Support Command, and as the project manager for projects such as Directed Energy Programs, Patriot PAC-3 Missile, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Missile System. He also served as the Army Program Executive Officer for Combat Support and Combat Service Support.³⁸

Lieutenant General O’Reilly’s final position in the United States Army was the Director for the MDA, which is a Department of Defense agency that develops, tests, and

³⁵Al Kamen, “Ig Report Blasts Missile Defense Chief,” *Washington Post*, 10 July 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/post/ig-report-blasts-missile-defense-chief/2012/07/10/gJQA9TCyaW_blog.html (accessed 7 April 2014).

³⁶U.S. Congress, House, “Speech of Honorable Mo Brooks, Representative from Alabama, Tribute to Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly,” 112th Cong., 1st sess., 2012, H. Doc. E1565, 1.

³⁷Missile Defense Agency Office of Public Affairs, “Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly,” Armed Services Committee, http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=cfd4d8-15ec-418b-81ac-3b8386f99b98 (accessed 2 March 2014).

³⁸*Ibid.*

fields the integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System, which protects the United States and its allies.³⁹ On 19 November 2012, Lieutenant General O'Reilly stepped down as the director of MDA and a 38-year career in the Army after a Department of Defense IG report found that he created a command climate that was ripe with fear and low morale.⁴⁰ How could an officer with as successful a career as Lieutenant General O'Reilly create a climate that left soldiers and civilians in a state of fear? He was a West Point graduate, an institution that stresses leadership, to include respect for others. Did Lieutenant General O'Reilly never possess the skills required to lead at this level or were his actions the result of the success that he achieved throughout his career?

Vignette Commonality

There are many common factors that each of the subjects of these vignettes share. These commonalities go beyond the fact that each of them is a male flag officer in the United States Army. It is important to understand what these subjects have in common in order to determine if there are characteristics that increase the probability that an officer has a greater likelihood of falling victim to their success.

The first characteristic that is common between the officers is their time in service. General Byrnes served the least amount of time with 36 years of service.⁴¹

³⁹Missile Defense Agency, "About," <http://www.mda.mil/about/about.html> (accessed 2 March 2014).

⁴⁰Tony Capaccio, "Panetta Lets Ex-Missile Defense Chief Keep His Rank," 2 January 2013, Bloomberg News, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-03/panetta-lets-ex-missile-defense-chief-keep-his-rank.html> (accessed 7 April 2014).

⁴¹Josh White, "Four-Star Army General Is Relieved of Command," *Houston Chronicle*, 10 August 2005, <http://www.chron.com/news/nation-world/article/Four-star-Army-general-is-relieved-of-command-1946694.php> (accessed 7 April 2014).

General Ward served the most amount of time with 41 years of service.⁴² Time in service is an important factor to consider because the level of experience, and the amount of time within the institution to understand its norms and expectations provides a basis to distinguish their actions from those of a person with much less experience.

The second commonality that is important to consider are the previous positions that each of these officers held, specifically within the short amount of time, between five to 10 years prior to the incident that brought about their failure. Each of these men held positions that were of varying degrees of complexity but all of which most people would consider as complex and of importance either within the military or to the nation as a whole. Their duty positions all required them to interact with political figures at the highest level, to include members of lobby groups, political support groups, the media, and entertainment industry. These men all performed at a high level in their previous assignments prior to becoming general officers; the assumption is that if they had not they would not have attained the rank that they did.

General Petraeus, who retired in 2011, held positions as a Division Commander in the 101st Airborne Division during initial operations in Iraq. His actions in the city of Mosul garnered the attention of prominent political figures in Washington, DC. He later assumed the duties as the commander of Multi-National Forces Iraq, United States Central Command, and then Commander of United States Forces Afghanistan.⁴³ During

⁴²Lolita C. Baldor, "Decision Soon On Ex-Africom Chief's Punishment," *Marine Corps Times*, 22 October 2012, <http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20121022/NEWS/210220304/Decision-soon-on-ex-AFRICOM-chief-s-punishment> (accessed 7 April 2014).

⁴³Bio, "David Howell Petraeus," A&E Television Networks, <http://www.biography.com/people/david-petraeus-39448> (accessed 19 March 2014).

this time, General Petraeus also received numerous accolades for his performance during the Global War on Terror. These accolades included *U.S. News and World Report* naming him one of “America’s 25 Best Leaders,” in 2005. He was one of four people who were runners up for *Time* magazine’s “Person of the Year” in 2007. Then in 2009, *Foreign Policy Magazine* named him one of the top 100 public intellectuals; while *Esquire* magazine named him as one of the 75 most influential people of the 21st century.⁴⁴

General Ward served as the Deputy Commander for Headquarters United States European Command, prior to assuming the responsibilities as the first commander of AFRICOM.⁴⁵ General Ward, as an African American officer, is in a small group of men that have risen to the rank of four-star general.⁴⁶ These two things are important to understand because assuming the duties of a brand new position and having the pressure to perform as man in a select group brings added stress and a new dynamic to understand for an individual.

General Byrnes, during the last five years of his career, served in various positions to include Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and director of the Army

⁴⁴U.S. Department of Defense, “General David H. Petraeus-Commander of International Security Assistance Force.”

⁴⁵U.S. Department of Defense, “General William E. (“Kip”) Ward—Commander, United States Africa Command.”

⁴⁶Terri Moon Cronk, “Army Honors Africom’s First Commander,” Department of Defense, 27 April 2011, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63703> (accessed 19 March 2014).

Staff.⁴⁷ General Byrnes final duty position was as the TRADOC commander during a time when the Army was transiting into the Global War on Terror. His responsibilities included the supervision of recruitment and academic programs for all Army schools to include all programs from basic training through the War College.⁴⁸ The positions that General Byrnes held were high-level and had an impact across the entire Army.

Lieutenant General O'Reilly, during the last five years of his career, served primarily in the MDA. He held the position of deputy director from 2007 to 2008, and then as the director from 2009 until his retirement. In 2009, he was responsible for the program, which developed missile defense in the European theater. This program was known as the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Previously he also served as the program manager for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. This system, developed through the MDA, was designed to defend the homeland against long-range ballistic missile attacks.⁴⁹ Again, these were assignments with extensive responsibility and visibility to the nation's highest leaders. The margin of failure was slight and the reward for success was attractive.

The third commonality between the four generals is their education. Each of them completed the requisite Army education that an officer of their level is required to complete. These schools include their undergraduate programs, through Officer

⁴⁷West-Point.org, "Force Projection Symposium IV," <http://www.west-point.org/users/usma1990/47566/fpiv/bios/byrnes.htm> (accessed 19 March 2014).

⁴⁸James Joyner, "General Kevin P. Byrnes, 4-Star Tradoc Commander, Relieved of Duty," Outside the Beltway (blog), 10 August 2005, http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/4-star_general_relieved_of_duty/ (accessed 19 March 2014).

⁴⁹Missile Defense Agency Office of Public Affairs, "Speech of Honorable Mo Brooks."

Candidate School, the Reserve Officer Training Corps, or the United States Military Academy. They all graduated from their respective branch qualifying schools and advanced courses. All four were graduates of the USACGSC and the Army War College. Finally, all four possessed advanced degrees from various institutions of higher education.

Although each of these men came into the military with different upbringings and values, for the most part they experienced a similar career with parallel educations, assignments, and exposures to the pressures of responsibility and interaction with upper level national leadership. There are no factors, available in a public forum that truly set any of these men apart from one another.

Current Army Leadership Doctrine

Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership*, outlines the current Army leadership doctrine. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 states that the Army exists to serve the American people, and in order to do this Army leaders must have values, impeccable character, and professional competence. In addition, these characteristics do not change, regardless of level of rank and responsibility. The Army Leadership Requirements Model referenced as the LRM throughout the rest of this thesis and illustrated below, outlines the attributes that all leaders, not exclusively officers should possess.⁵⁰

⁵⁰Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2013), 1-4 to 1-5. The LRM is figure 1-1 in ADRP 6-22.




Figure 2. The Army LRM

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2013), 1-5.

In addition to the LRM, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 outlines the seven Army Values. “The Army Values consist of the principles, standards, and qualities considered essential for successful Army leaders.”⁵¹ When a person becomes a member of the Army they bring with them personal values, developed over the course of their life. The Army Values are those qualities that the Army considers essential for a person to become a successful leader and are what a leader uses to teach subordinates. A way to recall these values is using the acronym, LDRSHIP, which stands for Loyalty, Duty,

⁵¹HQDA, ADRP 6-22, 3-1.

Respect, Selfless service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal courage. In the end all members of the Army “must develop” these values.⁵²

The third aspect of Army leadership that is important to consider is the Warrior Ethos. The Warrior Ethos, part of the Soldier’s Creed, is the way that the Army hopes individual soldiers will commit themselves to the profession, the nation, and a winning attitude. The illustration below outlines the Warrior Ethos.⁵³




Figure 3. The Soldier’s Creed

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2013), 3-4.

⁵²HQDA, ADRP 6-22, 3-1 to 3-2.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 3-4.

The LRM, Army Values, and Warrior Ethos are a basis to illustrate the major aspects of the current Army leadership doctrine. An awareness of these three pieces of information allows a person to understand the basic tenets of the Army Leadership Doctrine and apply it to this research.

Current Army Leadership Education and Training Program

Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58, *Army Leader Development Program*, outlines the program and includes the Army Leader Development Model. This model includes three domains and three focus areas. Figure 4, below illustrates the Army's Leader Development Model.




Figure 4. Army Leader Development Model

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58, *Army Leader Development Program* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 8 March 2013), 2-I.

Summary and Conclusions

There is an extensive amount of literature devoted to Emotional Intelligence and to the Bathsheba Syndrome. This literature is important in that it provides the basis for the author's research and the application of that research to what the author intends to analyze. The use of four separate case studies also helps to draw the relation between the ethical and moral failures of leaders to the theory of Emotional Intelligence and the propensity to fall victim to the Bathsheba Syndrome when an organizational-level leader, in this research flag officers, become successful. The presentation of the Army leadership doctrine and education process ensures that the reader is able to understand what each of officers either was taught, helped to develop, or should understand as the doctrine that all soldiers and civilians under their command must adhere.

The author dedicated the majority of this chapter to the case studies so that the reader was able to apply the examples of the leaders to the theories presented. Either there are many aspects of each of the individual's lives and careers that are omitted or not available due to the limitations set forth in this research. However, based on the scope of the research there is enough literature available to analyze these leaders and draw conclusion for the remainder of this paper.

After completing his research, the author does not believe that every aspect of the leadership doctrine, education, and training program requires inclusion in this paper. The reason for this is that the presented literature provides a synopsis of those aspects of the doctrine that are required for the reader to understand those themes and correlations that the author intends to present in the remainder of this paper.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to determine if there is a correlation between the levels of Emotional Intelligence that Army organizational leaders possess and if this, in conjunction, with success leads to failures. The author suggests that leaders are not prepared to deal with their success and display the characteristics of the Bathsheba Syndrome. In drawing this correlation, the author wants to suggest improvements to the Army leader development system, which will help leaders to counter the possibility of encountering the Bathsheba Syndrome. This research could help to identify Emotional Intelligence traits that the Army wishes to develop in junior officers and serve as a tool for the selection of future commanders for organizations.

Research Methodology

The author is using a qualitative case study comparison to determine the degree of Emotional Intelligence that the subjects of the case studies (vignettes) possessed. The qualitative case study approach as outlined by Sharan Merriam is, “an in-depth description and analysis of a bounded system.”⁵⁴ The comparison of the case studies, the phenomenon that senior army organizational level leaders succumb to the Bathsheba Syndrome, provides the reader with an intensive and holistic description of their

⁵⁴Sharan B. Merriam, *Qualitative Research: a Guide to Design and Implementation* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2009), 43.

behavior.⁵⁵ The bonded system that the author will examine is the possible phenomenon that these leaders were subject to the Bathsheba Syndrome after achieving great success.

In order to begin the research the author conducted a search of all pertinent sources of information, print and digital, with regards to Emotional Intelligence, the Bathsheba Syndrome, United States Army leadership training and education, and Army organizational-level leaders who have suffered failure, specifically those relieved from command or forced to retire early due to their transgressions. The author conducted multiple research inquiries throughout this process to ensure a complete analysis of all relevant work in the related fields.

The qualitative case study comparison method of research is feasible. It provides a means to compare four different incidents where senior level United States Army organizational-level leaders, who by all accounts were successful up to this point in their careers, failed. The research will include the perspective of the Army as an institution through the analysis of IG investigative reports, and military training references. These sources provide primary sources and the contextual information to show the relevance of the vignettes to the topic. The author will supplement these sources with as much media collaboration as possible. This method will add depth to the research and provide multiple viewpoints and perspectives about the subjects of the vignettes and the degree to which their failures demonstrate the Bathsheba Syndrome. All of this provides feasibility to the research.

⁵⁵Merriam, 46. Merriam provides a great description of the characteristics of the qualitative case study in this chapter and provides the reader with a means to classify any type of case study.

These vignettes and the associated references are suitable in the fact that they provide a wide range of topics about leadership failures. The four vignettes do not focus solely on the failures of leaders because of adulterous behaviors, which a person could expect based on the story of King David and Bathsheba. Two of the vignettes focus on the abuse of funds and the fostering of a hostile command climate. This provides the reader a means of applying the Emotional Intelligence and the Bathsheba Syndrome across multiple types of leadership failures.

With any research project, credibility is always essential. In order to ensure credibility the author exercised due diligence in capturing data from multiple, diverse sources. The author at all times attempted to use primary sources and sources from respected media outlets. Although the author captured as much research as possible at times, there was limited material available for the vignettes. This is because these events occurred recently, and the author attempted to capture the relevance of these failures while they were still current. In addition, the nature of these incidents lends themselves to having less material available to the public at large.

In order to increase the credibility of the research a thorough analysis of each of the case study subjects is required. This will provide all relevant information that could draw similarities between the officers in question. It provides a means of understanding the circumstances that each of these men encounter prior to their transgressions. It also allows the reader to understand their mentality and the factors that drove them to the decisions that they made.

Summary and Conclusion

In order to apply the concept of the Bathsheba Syndrome and Emotional Intelligence to United States Army organizational leaders a thorough analysis of the selected case studies was required. An understanding and selection of the definition and tenets of Emotional Intelligence is required to apply references to the thesis. A thorough analysis of the history of each of the officers is also required to determine any correlation between their situations. This correlation could help to determine possible reasons for their behaviors and relate directly to the proposed research questions.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to determine if there is a correlation between the levels of Emotional Intelligence that Army organizational leaders possess and if this, in conjunction, with success leads to failures. The author suggests that leaders are not prepared to deal with their success and display the characteristics of the Bathsheba Syndrome. In drawing this correlation, the author wants to suggest improvements to the Army leader development system, which will help leaders to counter the possibility of encountering the Bathsheba Syndrome. This research could help to identify Emotional Intelligence traits that the Army wishes to develop in junior officers and serve as a tool for the selection of future commanders for organizations.

Chapter Organization

The author organized this chapter into two main sections. The first section will address the primary research question. In the second section of this chapter, the author will discuss his secondary research questions. He will articulate how these questions relate to the primary research question and the topic as a whole. Upon completion of the first two sections, the author will present his conclusions and summary of the research.

Research Questions

Primary Research Question

The primary research question analyzed is: To what degree did the success of Army organizational-level leaders and their lack of Emotional Intelligence contribute to their failures?

How do you answer a question that has so many variables? The way to do this is breaking down the research question into separate parts. The author broke the research question into three parts. The first part dealt with the classification of these leaders as successful. The second part dealt with the level of Emotional Intelligence that they possessed and was there any indication that they lacked Emotional Intelligence. The third part was did this lack of Emotional Intelligence that the leaders demonstrated actually contribute to their failures, specifically did their Emotional Intelligence and the factors of the Bathsheba Syndrome exist, leading to their downfall?

All of these officers were extremely successful. Each officer was a commander or manager at some of the highest levels in the military. General Petraeus was an officer whom many, both military and civilian alike, considered extremely intelligent, brilliant in fact. He was in the running for *Time* magazine's man of the year and many people felt that he was a possible presidential candidate, after the completion of his military career. General Ward was the first commander of AFRICOM and one of only a handful of African American officers to achieve the rank of four-star general. There is little doubt about his success. General Byrnes was also very successful, he commanded TRADOC, the Army command that supervises and monitors the professional development and training of all military personnel in the Army. Again, it is hard to argue about his success.

Finally, Lieutenant General O'Reilly was responsible for the oversight of some of the most important defense projects that the United States was developing. There is little doubt that these leaders were successful. In fact, none of these officers showed any signs of failure or inappropriate behavior that would have warranted adverse action or require punitive actions prior to their final transgressions.

The second condition that the primary research question requires meeting is, did these leaders actually possess Emotional Intelligence, or did they lack certain qualities? All four of these leaders seemed to possess Emotional Intelligence in varying degrees. The degree to which these leaders displayed Emotional Intelligence is a factor of the information that was available about their interactions. General Petraeus has the most amount of information available about his action. The other three officers have less information available concerning the level of Emotional Intelligence that they possessed but their actions and the reaction of those around them is a positive indicator of their personalities.

General Petraeus, by all accounts was very self-aware. He was a man that could make decisions using his gut, after input from his staff and colleagues. He seemed to understand his strengths and weaknesses. His self-confidence was something that drew his subordinates and superiors alike, towards him.

Self-management was something that General Petraeus also seemed to possess. He was not a man known for violent outbursts or uncontrollable emotions, he seemed at all times to remain calm and demonstrate self-control. His adaptability in ever changing situations is apparent from the way that he was able to achieve success in Mosul and then later in Afghanistan. It is obvious that General Petraeus always improved his

performance and continually strived to achieve excellence. He never missed the opportunity to seize the initiative; this is evident throughout his career because of the number of times that his superiors requested his service. This is also a testament to his transparency, the ability to display honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness.

General Petraeus also possessed aspects of almost all the social competencies. He was socially aware. His ability to understand an organization was unmatched. Petraeus, like all leaders in the Army, faced a situation where he had to quickly assess a new organization and achieve results. Throughout his career, he was able to do this, and do it better than his peers.

Relationship management was an area in which General Petraeus always seemed to shine. He was an inspiration to many soldiers. It is evident that he is inspirational when there was such an outcry of support for him from across the military and civilian leadership in the country. There was a big debate about the severity of his situation from many circles when it finally became public. This fact also demonstrates his ability to influence those around him and build bonds. Like no other officer in the last decade, he was a change catalyst, always pushing the status quo and mentality of those above and below him.

General Ward, from what the author was able to discover, possessed some of the attributes of Emotional Intelligence. He was self-aware, able to understand his own emotions, he seemed to know his own strengths and weaknesses, and went with his gut when making decisions.

As far as self-management, there were no accounts of General Ward being the type of officer that lost his cool under pressure or demonstrated impulsive behavior,

except at the time of his abuse of government resources. He possessed the ability to lead AFRICOM, a organization that was not in existence before his tenure, with adaptive and creative thinking. General Ward achieved much in his career and was always able to improve upon the accomplishments of his previous assignments, and he would not have been as successful in his career if he were not able to take the initiative.

Social awareness is another area that General Ward seemed to demonstrate. He possessed organizational awareness. He understood the importance of AFRICOM, and how its mission supported the Department of Defense. His career was an example of service to the nation.

As the leader of such a large organization, General Ward displayed relationship management. He was able to build bonds and develop teams through collaboration. The structure of AFRICOM, located in Germany but responsible for Africa, makes this trait essential.

General Byrnes demonstrated some attributes of Emotional Intelligence throughout the readings and research the author conducted. He demonstrated self-awareness through his self-confidence in interviews that he gave after his military career. During these interviews, he also demonstrated aspects of self-management such as optimism for the projects on which he was currently working. His successful career also demonstrated aspects of Emotional Intelligence that he possessed. These competencies include adaptability, achievement, and initiative.

General Byrnes also demonstrated the social competencies of social awareness and relationship management, through his successful career. He showed organizational

awareness in his leadership of TRADOC at a time of change with the onset of the Global War on Terror.

Of all the gentlemen studied, , it is the easiest to determine which Emotional Intelligence competencies that Lieutenant General O'Reilly was lacking as opposed to the competencies that he possessed. This is possibly the result of the fact that the nature of his transgression was more public than the other officers or because more individuals reported his actions.

In the self-awareness domain, Lieutenant General O'Reilly obviously struggled with emotional self-awareness. He did not recognize that his emotions were causing him to act in such a way that developed a hostile command climate. This lack of emotional self-awareness coupled with his inflated self-confidence that he was always correct and never wrong were a hostile combination. He did not possess emotional self-control in the self-management domain. The actions that he took towards his subordinates were inexcusable. The fact that he felt it was appropriate for a subordinate to explain why they made a mistake and forced them to use profane language is evidence of this lack of emotional self-control and the inability to prevent disruptive behavior from surfacing. These three competencies combined to ensure that he was not able to display transparency to his subordinates, another category in the self-management domain. They had no trust in him whatsoever. Although it appears he was able to have transparency when he was dealing with his superiors because he was not relieved of his duties nor was any punitive action taken against him prior to assuming the role as the Director of the MDA.

In the social competencies, specifically the social awareness domain, Lieutenant General O'Reilly showed no empathy for his subordinates at all. If he were able to see how his actions were affecting these people from their perspective, he would realize that his actions were completely wrong. Although it was easier to identify the areas that Lieutenant General O'Reilly lacked there were also areas that the other three officers were lacking.

General Petraeus was lacking in three areas. He, like Lieutenant General O'Reilly, had too much self-confidence. He showed aspects of not possessing enough emotional self-control. This was apparent in the fact that he gave into having an affair with his biographer when he was still married. Another area that most people would think is good to be strong in is building bonds. General Petraeus is excellent at building a core group of people around him to solve problems and run an organization. The problem with this ability to build bonds is when those bonds become too strong and the group begins to demonstrate the propensity not to tell the leader what they are doing wrong. This behavior is an example of the old saying that the emperor wears no clothes. Who is it that will step up and tell the man in charge that they he is wrong or that he is doing something that he should stop doing immediately? General Petraeus may have fallen victim to having too much Emotional Intelligence in the social competency domain of building bonds.

General Ward's failure came because of his lack of an accurate self-assessment. He either did not know his limits or was ignorant of the limits on the use of government funds and resources. Another area that may have accounted for General Ward's failure was his dedication to service. Again, this seems counter intuitive but it actually makes a

lot of sense. He wanted to make sure to travel to make a case for the importance of AFRICOM and for organizations that represented the military in a positive light. Because he wanted to do what he thought was right, he might have pushed the limits of what was acceptable. In the end, it is hard to know for sure since we were not able to know exactly what he was thinking about at the time that he was abusing these funds and resources.

It seems that General Byrnes lacked Emotional Intelligence in two key areas. The first area was in self-confidence, the second area was in emotional self-control, and both domains are part of the personal competencies category. He was too self-confident. He continued to pursue his affair even after the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff his senior ranking officer gave him an order to cut off contact with his mistress. This behavior ties directly into him not possessing emotional self-control. He let the affair with this woman and whatever emotions that affair brought him overrule the fact that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered him to stop the relationship.

A look back at all four officers shows that the competencies that they are most likely to lack are the personal competencies and not the social competencies. This means that their failures are truly a result of their lack of Emotional Intelligence on a personal level and not the way they deal with other people. This fact is important to understand before analyzing the Bathsheba Syndrome. It is also important when trying to connect these areas of Emotional Intelligence back to the failures of these leaders.

The Bathsheba Syndrome focuses on four areas where successful leaders fall prey to failure. Those four areas are when the leader loses focus or becomes complacent, when they gain more or complete control of organizational resources, when they feel that they have the ability to control the outcome of their actions, and finally when they gain

privileged access to resources, people or other objects. These factors or combinations of them were present in each of case studies.

Leaders often fall victim to losing focus or becoming complacent, especially when they are at the top of their profession. There is no longer a drive to reach the next pinnacle of their career. In the case of these four officers, Petraeus and Ward could only truly attain two more duty positions within the Army, the position of Chief of Staff of the Army and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while General Byrnes also had the ability to become a Combatant Commander. Although Lieutenant General O'Reilly had more room for promotion, he was still at one of the highest duty positions for his career field. All four of these men had over 35 years of experience and were only a set of paperwork away from retirement if they chose to do so. In fact, there is nothing to indicate these men, except possibly for General Petraeus, aspired to go beyond their positions. In fact that may be the reason that General Petraeus decided to take the position as Central Intelligence Agency Director. Just solely based on the nature of the military promotions these men were prone to complacency.

These men were also extremely successful in their chosen career fields. There was no reason for them to believe that they would not continue to achieve success. The fact that they had already achieved so much and that their potential for promotion beyond their current position was lower they lost focus and became complacent.

Another aspect of complacency and loss of focus is the degree of success that an organization enjoys. This also includes the degree to which the organization is able to run without the supervision of the leader. All four of these organizations were very large, with levels of leadership that ensured that the focus of the organization was correct. In a

military system, the commander is the person who provides a vision and focuses the organizations where needed based on his experience. If the organization is successful and efficient, it runs itself with little input from the commander. In all four case studies, these organizations were proficient and already had the input of the commander, who could step back and let their subordinate leaders run the organizations.

When a leader rises to a certain level of responsibility, he gains access and control of organizational resources at a level that is nearly unhindered. This ability to control and influence how these resources are employed is very tempting and can cause anyone, whether they are ethical or not, to fall victim to the allure of the power they have. These officers were the ones who set the agenda for the organizations they ran, and they are the ones who made the decisions within the organizations. Each of these men commanded or managed organizations with extensive resources and with little supervision from a superior officer or authority.

General Petraeus was in charge of all United States and coalition forces in Afghanistan. It is very hard to fathom the amount of personnel, equipment, and money that he oversaw. In his capacity as International Security and Assistance Forces Commander, he only reported to the United States Central Command commander and the Secretary of Defense. General Ward was the commander of AFRICOM a Geographic Combatant Command Headquarters with personnel and resources on two continents. His ability to influence the use of these resources was only limited by the amount of control the Secretary of Defense gave him. General Byrnes was in charge of the training and doctrine for the entire Army as the TRADOC commander. This is a position with a span of responsibility that stretches across the continental United States and into much of the

rest of the world. Lieutenant General O'Reilly was the director for the MDA with projects and programs that have strategic impacts on the United States. The amount of money and equipment that he oversaw and had control of was enormous. In addition, the nature of the programs that he worked on allowed him access and interaction with many higher-level officials.

As the head of such large organizations these men were entrusted with extensive resources, many of which they had exclusive control over. This control also includes the normal benefits of the rank of general officer, which include aides, vehicles, aircraft, and funds for the execution of their duty position. To say that these men did not have such access or control is very short sighted.

So far, these two conditions of the Bathsheba Syndrome deal with organizational level conditions. The other two conditions deal with personal level conditions.

The first personal level condition is privileged access to information, personnel, or objects. This privileged access is something that no one else or very few within the organization possess. Privileged access is a condition that gives the leader the ability to have control, exert influence, and reward actions over those that they command or with whom they interact. In all four case studies, privileged access is inherent in their duties but there are also examples of how they used this access in a way that contributed to their failures.

In General Petraeus' case it is easier to identify the condition of privileged access. At the level of command that he enjoyed he was able to have access to a personal biographer. At no other level within that organization would this have been possible to that extent. He was able to arrange transportation and housing for this woman, allocate

time for their interactions, and give her access to areas that many would argue she should not have had. General Petraeus' privileged access gave him the latitude to do as he wanted and that latitude was his downfall.

General Ward and General Byrnes also had privileged access. Both men enjoyed the benefits of a flag officer. These benefits included access to government aircraft, vehicles, and funds for the execution of their duties. In the case of General Ward, this access was a cause of his failure. He abused these benefits, either intentionally or unintentionally, and it was the catalyst for his retirement. General Byrnes also had similar benefits and it was with these benefits that he perpetuated his adulterous behavior. The ability for any officer below him to use such benefits in a similar way as he did would be difficult. Unfortunately, these benefits, which were supposed to help them with the execution of their duties actually hindered them and contributed to the end of their careers.

Lieutenant General O'Reilly, much as the other three gentlemen, also had privileged access. His privileged access was not to the same extent as the other generals just because of the nature of his duty position and the fact that he was not a four-star general. He did have influence with many people, such as contractors and political representatives because of the nature of the work that the MDA conducts. His position as the Director of the MDA would also give him access to personnel who work within the agency that others would not enjoy. This area was not as much of a contributing factor to Lieutenant General O'Reilly's failures as with the other men.

The second personal level condition and final condition of the Bathsheba syndrome is an inflated belief in personal ability, or the thought that the leader is able to

control the outcome of their actions. This condition is very easy to manifest for a military officer. From very early on in the officer's career superiors and instructors at various levels of professional military education tell commanders they are the ones who are responsible for the success or failure of their organizations. This responsibility, coupled with the requisite skills and aggression to become a successful commander, ingrains in officers a sense that they can control anything that happens in their organization and in their lives. This control can come in the form of knowing what will happen on the battlefield and reacting to become successful no matter the situation. Moreover, this control manifests and transfers over to their personal life where they feel they are able to make anything that goes wrong come out better in the end through personal traits like hard work, superior intellect, or brute force.

This ability to control the outcome of their actions is also a factor of the nature of their positions. Each of these positions isolates these men, meaning that it is not easy to find someone who understands the responsibilities that they have. This isolation, many times, results in them having an inflated ego. They feel that they are the only ones who can run the organization and that they are the only ones who have the answers. These positions also breed conditions of extreme stress and the fear of failure in these men.

Examples of how these men felt they could control the outcome of their actions are difficult to pinpoint. General Petraeus was not going to step down as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency after the reports of his affair went public, according to his aides, and as was reported in the *Washington Post*.⁵⁶ This is an indicator of how he

⁵⁶Sari Horwitz, Kimberly Kindy, and Scott Wilson, "Petraeus Hoped Affair Would Stay Secret and He Could Keep His Job as Cia Director," *Washington Post*, 12

thought he could control the outcome of his actions. General Byrnes refused to follow the orders of his superior officer and stop the affair that he was having. This is another example of how he may have felt that he could control the outcome of his actions. Lieutenant General O'Reilly also said that the accusations of him fostering a hostile work environment were simply the product of a few disgruntled employees.⁵⁷ This is yet another example of how this man felt that he was not wrong and that he could control the accusations against him. In all four case studies, except for General Ward, there is an example of a behavior that is evidence that these men felt they could control the outcome of their actions.

All four of these leaders demonstrated a lack of Emotional Intelligence in one form or another. They also had three conditions linked to the Bathsheba Syndrome. This evidence suggests that a lack of Emotional Intelligence and the conditions of the Bathsheba Syndrome, without personal knowledge of the thinking of these men, contributes significantly to the failure of leaders who experience a great deal of success in their positions as organizational-level leaders.

Secondary Research Questions

The first secondary research question analyzed is: In what ways should the Army incorporate Emotional Intelligence into leader development programs to educate and train leaders to deal with the Bathsheba Syndrome and the impacts of success?

November 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/petraeus-told-biographer-to-stop-harassing-family-friend-officials-say/2012/11/12/6ccb325c-2d00-11e2-a99d-5c4203af7b7a_story.html (accessed 7 April 2014).

⁵⁷Kamen.

The Army's program for leader development is excellent. In fact, corporate America is and has been emulating and borrowing from its program for decades. However, some areas of the program need a greater emphasis. The program may also require the addition of topics to help prevent successful leaders from failing.

The Army LRM is an excellent visual tool that shows the leadership attributes and competencies that the Army wants every leader to possess or work towards improving. However, three of the areas that need more emphasis to help prevent the failures of leaders are the competencies of "Prepares Self" and "Gets Results," and the attribute of "Confidence."⁵⁸ Both of these competencies and this attribute are very important but the way that the Army teaches them or frames their importance requires another look.

Prepares Self is a very broad term. It seems to refer to the Army Leader Development Model domain of Self-development. However, the Army gives little guidance to officers about self-development. What are the traits that these officers need to develop? Many leaders say that they want leaders who are adaptive, innovative, and creative. Although these traits are, at face value, beneficial, how does an officer develop them internally? What is the plan that officers need to use to develop themselves? Is it solely a product of what they want or should the emphasis come from their superior officers? One fact that is unavoidable when answering these questions is that all four leaders in the case studies suffered from a lack of Emotional Intelligence that was tied directly to personal competencies. If this competency is so important, why did at least three of the four leaders fail in two of the personal competencies?

⁵⁸HQDA, ADRP 6-22, 1-4 to 1-5.

Gets Results is a competency that requires caution when the Army is teaching officers and future commanders. At what cost do you get results? What will you do to get them? Whom will you hurt or sacrifice to get results? If the only thing that an officer cares about is getting results, they are setting themselves up for failure when they succeed. These four men got results, they were all very successful, but at what cost did they get those results? In the case of Lieutenant General O'Reilly, the cost was the dignity of his subordinates and the destruction of a proper command climate. In the case of the three other officers, it was an end to a career and personal disgrace.

The competency of Gets Results falls under the category of Achieves on the LRM. Doctrine writers need to do one of two things. First, they either need to add more competencies under the category of Achieves, in order to place less emphasis on this competency, which communicates to leaders that the only thing that matters is not the results of their actions. If adding more competencies is not the preferred solution the second course of action is to remove the competency and category of Gets Results and Achieves all together. The LRM should not display Gets Results by itself. If the LRM remains this way, an individual who is not familiar with the entire leader development process will be more prone to focus on this one attribute and draw conclusions about its importance.

The final aspect of the LRM is the attribute of Confidence. It is obvious that a military leader requires confidence to lead effectively. However, where is the line between having enough confidence to accomplish the mission and lead, and too much confidence that leads to failure? In three of the four case studies, the officers displayed too much self-confidence. The only officer that it appears did not was General Ward. So

how do you teach an officer to have confidence? One of the ways to teach them confidence is to place a greater emphasis on emotional intelligence. Another way is to continue to focus on a leader development program that incorporates the LRM as a whole.

The Army needs to look at itself and make sure that it balances the results that it wants on the battlefield and what it is willing to accept when not at war. It must look from its senior leaders all the way down through the ranks and figure out a way to identify those officers who are the most competent and yet can still maintain the level of professionalism that they require. One way to do this is for the Army to incorporate more Emotional Intelligence training into leader development courses for both officers and non-commissioned officers. The Army also needs to make sure that they overtly talk about the topic of Emotional Intelligence and the dangers of success, specifically the Bathsheba Syndrome, at these courses. Another topic that needs emphasis is teaching about the pitfalls of success, which needs to come at the earliest levels in the education and training of leaders. Leaders must not always think that they are finished once they achieve success. There is much more that a leader has to think about after they have reached the objective or the mission is complete.

The second secondary research question analyzed is: What factors of Emotional Intelligence are the most important for an organizational level leader to possess and how can the Army identify leaders with these attributes?

The factors of Emotional Intelligence that are the most important for an organizational level leader to possess are emotional self-control, appropriate self-

confidence, and empathy. In all four case studies, three factors of Emotional Intelligence stood out amongst the rest.

Emotional self-control is the trait that leaders must possess to be effective. If a leader cannot demonstrate emotional self-control in the majority of situations, there is the likelihood that they will become, what many are now defining as, toxic leaders. This was the case with Lieutenant General O'Reilly.

Self-confidence is important, but too much self-confidence is usually destructive. In three of the four case studies, the leaders demonstrated too much self-confidence. This led them more easily into the condition of the Bathsheba Syndrome of thinking that they could control the outcome of their actions. It is important to know the balance of too much confidence and knowing when your confidence becomes a bias against logical and sound judgment.

Empathy is a trait that is very important for a leader. The author found it difficult to determine if the leaders in the case studies were empathic. It is truly a trait that only the follower or subordinate can determine. Empathy is important because it will usually ensure that you treat those around you with dignity and respect. In today's society, self-centered, selfish action is the norm and not the exception. Empathy is usually a trait that a person either has or does not.

The identification of these three Emotional Intelligence traits is not easy. Some of the systems already in place are good at identifying these traits. One of these systems is the Multi-Source Assessment Feedback 360-degree (MSAF 360) survey that the Army

has already incorporated.⁵⁹ This system will always go through refinements as the Army discovers and faces new leadership challenges within its ranks. Another system, or possibly a modification to the MSAF 360 survey, needs to incorporate a more robust peer and subordinate feedback system. This system may need to be anonymous, but it may be beneficial in identifying leaders with the required Emotional Intelligence traits for leadership.

In the end, the Army will benefit from the identification of leaders with sufficient Emotional Intelligence. However, there is always the requirement to balance these traits with the other traits and attributes that the Army requires for success.

Summary and Conclusions

Based on the analysis of the four case studies it is apparent that the level of Emotional Intelligence that a leader possesses, and the conditions of the Bathsheba Syndrome, when present, can cause a successful leader who has never failed to make unethical or poor judgments. The Army must change the way that it trains and educates leaders if it hopes to prevent this failure of success from continuing. The Army can incorporate several things to help identify leaders with the requisite Emotional Intelligence traits to command and lead. It is important that the Army attempt to identify these leaders and educate those already in leadership roles about the pitfalls of the

⁵⁹The Army MSAF 360 is an assessment tool that incorporates superior, peer, and subordinate feedback so that leaders can have a means to adapt their leadership and provide self-awareness. For more information see MSAF 360, “Lead On,” Official Website of the United States Army, <http://msaf.army.mil/LeadOn.aspx> (accessed 12 April 2014).

Bathsheba Syndrome and the way to leverage their level of Emotional Intelligence
against the conditions that may lead to their failure, especially when they are successful.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this research is to determine if there is a correlation between the levels of Emotional Intelligence that Army organizational leaders possess and if this, in conjunction, with success leads to failures. The author suggests that leaders are not prepared to deal with their success and display the characteristics of the Bathsheba Syndrome. In drawing this correlation, the author wants to suggest improvements to the Army leader development system, which will help leaders to counter the possibility of encountering the Bathsheba Syndrome. This research could help to identify Emotional Intelligence traits that the Army wishes to develop in junior officers and serve as a tool for the selection of future commanders for organizations.

The organization of chapter 5 includes four sections. The first section of the chapter summarizes the findings from the previous chapter. The second section is an interpretation of those findings. The third section provides a summary for chapter 5 alone. The fourth and final section is a summary of the entire thesis, to include a summary of the findings, areas for future research, and lessons learned throughout the course of the research.

In chapter 4, the author analyzed four separate case studies to determine the amount of Emotional Intelligence that the subjects possessed or displayed. With this information about the nature of the Emotional Intelligence of the four organizational level leaders, the author compared the conditions of the Bathsheba Syndrome to determine if the true nature of the failure of these leaders was in fact their success. This analysis answered the primary research question: To what degree did the success of Army

organizational-level leaders and their lack of Emotional Intelligence contribute to their failures?

During the analysis, it was apparent that each of the subjects of the case studies was a successful leader; each appeared to lack at least two or more of the Emotional Intelligence domains, and each of them showed susceptibility to three or more of the conditions of the Bathsheba Syndrome, which ties into one of the secondary research questions.

Each of the leaders lacked Emotional Intelligence traits. Specifically, General Petraeus suffered from too much self-confidence, not enough emotional self-control, and had a strength of building bonds that may have contributed to his failure. General Ward suffered from the inability for accurate self-assessment, and a susceptibility to making poor choices because of his unwavering dedication to service. General Byrnes suffered from too much self-confidence, and significantly lacked emotional self-control. Lieutenant General O'Reilly demonstrated the lack of the most traits. His shortfalls came in the area of too much self-confidence, lack of emotional self-control, lack of emotional self-awareness, lack of empathy, and lack of transparency. The commonality between most of the subjects was too much self-confidence and a lack of emotional self-control.

Specifically, the following conditions of the Bathsheba Syndrome were present in each of the case studies. In all four cases studies the conditions of privileged access and control of organizational resources was prevalent. Loss of focus or complacency was present in the cases of Generals Ward, Byrnes, and O'Reilly. The ability to control the outcome of their actions was evident in all of the case studies except for General Ward.

In conjunction with the analysis of the case studies, the author tried to determine which Emotional Intelligence traits were the most important for a leader to possess. In order to make this determination the author researched the Army's leader development program and compared its content to the primary research question. This analysis was designed to answer the first secondary research question: In what ways should the Army incorporate Emotional Intelligence into leader development programs to educate and train leaders to deal with the Bathsheba Syndrome and the impacts of success?

The ways that the Army should incorporate Emotional Intelligence into its leader development program are to educate and train leaders to deal with the Bathsheba Syndrome and success. The Army needs to focus more attention on the traits of Emotional Intelligence concerning the Army LRM. The specific competencies and attributes are Prepares Self, Gets Results, and Confidence. Each of these three areas will help to prevent future officers and leaders from failing when they are successful. The author recommends that the Army remove the competency of Gets Results from the category of Achieves, or adds other competencies to this category to prevent leaders from placing too much emphasis on this trait. Another area that the Army needs to focus on is the training of leaders to deal with the conditions of success and not just how to prevent failure.

The second and final secondary research question that the author analyzed was: What factors of Emotional Intelligence are the most important for an organizational level leader to possess and how can the Army identify leaders with these attributes? The three traits that are most important for organizational level leaders to possess, based on the case study analysis, are emotional self-control, appropriate self-confidence, and empathy. The

ways that the Army may be able to identify these traits in leaders is using current assessments such as the MSAF 360, with revisions to incorporate an analysis of the competencies listed previously, or the development of a more robust peer and subordinate feedback system to identify leaders who either possess or lack the requisite Emotional Intelligence factors.

Based on the case study analysis it is obvious that leaders who lack some of, or the majority of the Emotional Intelligence traits are susceptible to failure when they are successful. A lack of Emotional Intelligence compounded with the factors of the Bathsheba Syndrome develops a situation that requires an enormous amount of vigilance on the part of the leader to prevent failure. The Army must identify leaders who possess the proper amount of Emotional Intelligence and train its leaders to recognize the situations prior to failure. Included in this training is a better understanding of the factors of the Bathsheba Syndrome. Another recommendation is that the Army trains subordinates to recognize these traits in their leaders to allow them to be better followers, who can prevent leaders from failing.

If the Army does not identify leaders with these traits and they continue to fail, the implications are severe. These behaviors may develop mistrust within the military of its senior leaders from the flag officer ranks downward. This mistrust will prevent the military from operating effectively. It will have lasting impacts on the professionalism of the military and the trust that the public places in the leadership of the Army and military. It also creates an environment of disloyalty within the Army. This disloyalty is evident in the reaction of soldiers when lower ranking personnel commit similar offenses and receive more severe punishment. Another implication is continued mistrust of the

military by the American public. If these senior leaders, who are the figurehead and embodiment of the profession, are willing to lie about these actions, what other things are they lying about? What are all the leaders subordinate to them and those who follow these leaders doing that is unethical? These are just a few of the implications of their actions.

In this chapter, the author presented the findings of the research. Based on the findings it was determined that many organizational level leaders fail because of their success. These failures are the result of leaders who are lacking certain Emotional Intelligence traits, specifically too much self-confidence, lack of empathy, and not enough emotional self-control, and the presence of the conditions of the Bathsheba Syndrome.

The Army needs to educate and train leaders to identify the conditions of the Bathsheba Syndrome as well as place more of an emphasis on the traits of Emotional Intelligence. This emphasis can take the form of increased training on the Army LRM, to include the removal of the Gets Results competency or addition of other competencies under the Achieves category, or further study of leadership failures associated with this research.

The Army also needs to develop systems to identify leaders with the requisite Emotional Intelligence. The use of systems, such as the MSAF 360, can accomplish the identification. However, the system may require modification to place a greater focus on Emotional Intelligence traits that peers and subordinates access in individual leaders. This process of identification and assessment will help to prevent future incidents, as well as help to maintain the professionalism of the leadership groups within the Army.

The issue of Army organizational level leaders falling prey to the Bathsheba Syndrome and their lack of Emotional Intelligence is significant. If the Army does not address this issue, it will have lasting, and even irrevocable consequences.

Thesis Summary

The purpose for this research was to determine if there was a correlation between the level of Emotional Intelligence that Army organizational level leaders possess and their susceptibility to failure when they are most successful. The author proposed that these leaders were not prepared for their success, and that these successful leaders failed because of the presence of the conditions of the Bathsheba Syndrome. In the end, the author hoped that this research would provide the Army with a means to adjust the Army leader development system in order to aid leaders in dealing with success and preventing them from succumbing to the Bathsheba Syndrome. The purpose was to identify Emotional Intelligence traits that can be developed in junior officers and be used by the Army to select future organizational level leaders. This research could help to identify Emotional Intelligence traits that the Army wishes to develop in junior officers, and serve as a tool for the selection of future commanders for organizations.

To conduct this research the author developed three research questions, one primary, and two secondary. The primary research question was: To what degree did the success of Army organizational-level leaders and their lack of Emotional Intelligence, contribute to their failures? The first secondary research question was: In what ways should the Army incorporate Emotional Intelligence into leader development programs to educate and train leaders to deal with the Bathsheba Syndrome and the impacts of success? The second secondary research question was: What factors of Emotional

Intelligence are the most important for an organizational level leader to possess and how can the Army identify leaders with these attributes?

To answer the primary research question there were three areas to analyze. The first was: Were these four leaders successful? As evidence from their careers and the responsibilities that the civilian and military leadership of the country gave them, and the lack of any derogatory evaluations of their previous performance, this question seemed relatively easy to answer.

The second area that required research was: What were the Emotional Intelligence traits that these leaders possessed or lacked? Based on analysis it was apparent that General Petraeus possessed the majority of the Emotional Intelligence traits. He was both self and socially aware. Generals Ward and Byrnes also seemed to have many of these traits, however not to the extent or as evident as General Petraeus. Of the four gentlemen studied, Lieutenant General O'Reilly was the easiest to identify as lacking many of the Emotional Intelligence traits. With this information, the author was able to move onto his third area of research.

The third area was: Did these Emotional Intelligence traits, or lack thereof, combine with the conditions of the Bathsheba Syndrome to cause these successful leaders to fail? Table 1 is a summary of the findings in this area.

Table 1. Summary of Findings

<u>Emotional Intelligence trait</u>	<u>Individual(s) possessing</u>
Too much self-confidence	Petraeus, Byrnes, O'Reilly
Lack of emotional self-control	Petraeus, Byrnes, O'Reilly
Building inappropriate bonds	Petraeus
Poor accurate self-assessment	Ward
Over dedication to service	Ward
Lack of emotional self-awareness	O'Reilly
Lack of transparency	O'Reilly
Lack of empathy	O'Reilly
<u>Bathsheba Syndrome Condition</u>	<u>Individual(s) susceptible</u>
Loss of focus/complacency	Ward, Byrnes, O'Reilly
Control of organizational resources	Petraeus, Ward, Byrnes, O'Reilly
Ability to control outcome of actions	Petraeus, Byrnes, O'Reilly
Privileged access	Petraeus, Ward, Byrnes, O'Reilly

Source: Created by author.

Based on the analysis of the primary research question the author determined that the Army should incorporate Emotional Intelligence into its leader development program in the following ways. First, the Army's LRM needs to emphasize three specific areas. These three areas are: Prepares Self, Gets Results, and Confidence. When the Army deals with the development of leaders it needs to ensure that there is plan in place for self-development that incorporates the principles of Emotional Intelligence. The Army needs to shift focus away from Gets Results because this does not clearly outline at what cost the leaders obtains these results and it can lead to individuals who only focus on achievement at the price of their ethics or morality. Because three of the four individuals in the case studies suffered from too much self-confidence this is another area on which the Army must focus its attention. Second, the Army needs to talk more overtly about Emotional Intelligence. It is an important topic and there are suggestions of its use

throughout the Army's doctrine but there is very little attention given to the topic. In fact, it is hard to find many leaders who know of or have a comprehensive understanding of the topic. Emotional Intelligence needs to become part of the Army's training and it needs to have a great part in leader development. Finally, the Army needs to include the Bathsheba Syndrome in its leader development program. This syndrome is dangerous and even if leadership failures are not completely attributed to its presence, there are many aspects of it throughout the ethical and moral lapses of leaders today.

The final research question that the author attempted to answer was: What are the most important Emotional Intelligence traits for an organizational level leader to possess and how can the Army identify these traits in personnel? Based on the case studies the most important traits are emotional self-control, appropriate self-confidence, and empathy. To identify these traits the Army needs to develop new systems that include greater peer and subordinate feedback about the qualities of the leaders with whom they serve. Another option is for the Army to improve current systems, like the MSAF 360, with increased aspects of Emotional Intelligence.

It is very important that the Army and other branches of the military, which all have seen increased numbers of leadership failures, address the leaders who are displaying this failure of success. If the Army and military leaders do not address this problem, civilian leaders may take away their authority to correct it.

Recommendations for Further Research

Throughout his research, the author discovered various subjects and topics for further research. Many of these topics developed because of questions that arose that were outside the scope of the research topic, or that were parallel areas of research.

The first topic for further research is the separation between moral or ethical failures and professional competence. Whenever the author presented his topic of research to a third party, the discussion almost always touched on the fact that in the civilian sector the discovery of an adulterous affair, in most cases, did not have the same impact as it would in the military. This may be the case as long as there is no punitive regulation or policy that a civilian institution has in place for adulterous behavior. Some of the other questions associated with this topic include the idea that the military may hold senior leaders to too high of a standard. Another question would be: Should the Uniformed Code of Military Justice not include Article 134 punishing adulterous behavior, and only include Article 133 for the offense of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentlemen?⁶⁰ Should the performance of our soldiers and leaders not include their moral character so long as that character allows them to carry out the mission that the nation entrusts them to complete?

The second area for further research deals with the type of leaders that the military requires. Do the requisite skills, temperament, and personality that the military requires for success contradict the values and character that it requires? In other words because of the nature of the military and war, which requires leaders who are willing to take risks at great costs, actually encouraging leaders who develop a propensity for risky or questionable behavior? This question then leads to how does the military and our civilian authorities balance the desire for leaders who feel they can win no matter what the situation, with the criticism that the military places on these leaders when they do

⁶⁰Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, *Manual for Courts-Martial, United States* (2012 Edition), Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM-2012.pdf (accessed 3 April 2014). IV 100-104.

wrong? When these leaders do commit such violations, what should their punishment entail? How do you balance their punishment with the need to deter future violations and the need to maintain enough senior leaders who can execute the role that these officers fill? What is the right balance when the replacement of such senior level officers is not practical given the amount of experience and knowledge that only a lifetime of service in the military will allow an officer to execute these roles?

The third area for future research deals with the standards and values system that the Army applies. Is the current values system that the Army uses to measure the effectiveness and morality of leaders not in line with the societal values that the majority of the American population believes? Has this deviation between the two belief systems encouraged soldiers to join the military and encouraged them to follow the Army's belief system to ensure a successful career?

The fourth area for future research deals with the requirement and need for a senior leader to develop a staff or guiding coalition, as presented in the Kotter change model, a topic that is taught at USACGSC?⁶¹ The first question is: Does a staff or guiding coalition encourage, facilitate, or allow senior commanders to commit such moral and ethical violations? If the answer is yes, then what are the measures that leaders and the Army can take in order to prevent this from happening? One outcome could be regulations or policies that dictate the amount of time or number of assignments that specific staff officers may serve with senior level commanders. Another outcome may show that senior leaders have too many benefits that come with attaining a certain rank,

⁶¹John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 52.

thus adding to the likelihood of a lack of Emotional Intelligence, on the part of the leader, making them susceptible to the effects of the Bathsheba Syndrome.

The fifth area for future research deals with the identification of toxic leaders. There are many definitions for the term toxic leader. However, one of the things that the author noticed when researching Lieutenant General O'Reilly, the identification of several Emotional Intelligence traits that he was lacking was easier than with the other gentlemen. Is the problem of toxic leadership truly not a leadership problem but an Emotional Intelligence problem? Are the leaders who display these toxic traits really just lacking the Emotional Intelligence traits to become successful leaders? On the other hand, are other leaders who commit less severe offenses just as toxic but the identification of their traits is harder because of the nature of said offense?

The sixth area for future research deals with the issue of military leaders marrying primarily to further their careers. Do some leaders look for a spouse who is the ideal Army spouse, not their ideal spouse? Is there research about the marriages of these leaders that can help future leaders as they deal with the struggles of success and balancing a marriage with the other stresses of military life?

The seventh area for future research deals with the characteristics of the subjects of these case studies. In all four of these case studies, the subject was a male flag officer. It would very interesting to determine the correlation between the failures of male versus female leaders or leaders of other demographics to determine if there are similarities between them. This topic is of increased relevance due to the number of combat arms positions that the Army is currently opening to women.

The eighth area for future research deals with the environment within the Army. Specifically, does the basis of how the Army evaluates its leaders as successful contradict the values and character that the leadership says a professional soldier should possess? Is the Army developing a contradictory environment in which its leaders are operating? Does the Army focus too much on mission accomplishment and getting results? Should the Army focus more on factors such as bettering the organization or increasing the trust with the public?

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